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Long-term Structural Unemployment
Source: OECD; ILO
l Global Unemployment:
204 millions in 2016; 5.6%.
l If they formed their own
country, the unemployed
would be the 5th largest
country in the world.
l High rates of long-term
structural unemployment;
l Example: Europe-5 (52.8%
in 2015, compared to OECD-
average of 33.8%).
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Addressing Shortcomings in LMR Literature
Large LMRs literature: E¢ ciency wages, U.Benets, Min wages,
C.Bargaining, Search [van Schaik & de Groot (2000), Meckl
(2004), Zagler (2009; 2011), Bhattacharyya & Gupta (2015),
Cacciatore & Fiori (2016), Chang & Hung (2016)]
Shortcomings that we attempt to address:
1. Key Issue: Simultaneous LMRs - In Practice, LMRs often
implemented in Packages. Ignoring Policy Externalities: a
potential source of bias.
2. Welfare e¤ects and trade-o¤s with growth;
3. Transitional dynamics (hence, dynamic trade-o¤s of LMRs)
often neglected due to limited attention to supply side of
workforce composition;
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Model Overview
Issues addressed in the following settings:
I Innovation driven OLG growth model, with heterogeneous
labor force (untrained & specialized), LM
rigidities-generated structural unemployment in equilibrium;
I 2-period individuals with di¤erent innate abilities; In old age,
time is allocated to leisure;
I 4 production sectors: manufacturing (homogeneous nal
good); intermediate goods (IGs); innovation (designs for
producing IGs); education (allows skills acquisition);
I Impact of LMRs is assessed not only in terms of
unemployment, growth, and welfare, but also misallocation
of talent.
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Individuals
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Skills Acquisition - depends on Expected S-U wage
Threshold level of ability, aCt , above which individuals choose to
undergo training depends on
(1  ULt )wUt + ULt bUt ,
(1  ")(SYt wSYt + SRt wSRt + SLt bSt )  tct ,
where  jt ; j = SY ; SR; SL;UL are respective probabilities.
Training cost proportional to expected S-wage & inversely related
to ability.
Key channel through which unemployment/public policy a¤ect
supply side of labor market.
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Overview of Production Sectors
Final Good Sector Innovation Sector
S-type labor supplyU-type labor supply
Wage rate, S-type
labor
Wage rates, U-type labor
S-type labor
Trade union
Minimum wage
Shirking
Detection risk
Production Structure and the Labor Market
Education decision
(Beginning of  adulthood)
Unemployment
Intermediate Good
Sector
Training cost
Unemployment benefits
Mandated compensation
Highest abilities
Blueprints
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LMR Feature 1 (T.Union and Minimum Wage)
I FG: Wages set through a right-to-manage bargaining process
between a centralized trade union & rms.
I Union maximizes, for h = U;SY :
Vht = (w
h
t   whTt )
h
(Nht )
1 h ;
subject to labor demand functions. Solution:
wht = (
1  h
1  2h )w
hT
t ;
where wUTt = w
UM
t (
UL
t )
 {U , wUMt = wU0 (
Yt
N
).
I Similar specication SY-workers.
I In a growth setting: minimum wage, target wages, and benet
rates must rise at same rate as (average) income.
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LMR Feature 2 (U.Insurance, Endogenous Payroll Taxes)
I Gov. operates u.insurance fund (nanced by payroll
contribution of rms), in addition to general budget.
(bUt 
UL
t +b
S
t 
SL
t ) N = & tfwUt UYt +(1 ")(wSYt SYt +wSRt SRt )gN;
which implies
& t =
bUt 
UL
t + b
S
t 
SL
t
wUt 
UY
t + (1  ")(wSYt SYt + wSRt SRt )
:
I Implication:higher unemployment may raise the payroll tax if
wages do not fall enough; may further depress unemployment.
I To ensure nondegenerate solution, UI set as a linear function
of level of per capita income: bht = 
h Yt
N
; h = U;S :
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LMR Feature 3 (Innovation - E¢ ciency wage framework)
I Sub-utility function:
UR (wSRt ; 1  eRt ) = ln[(wSRt )R (1  eRt )1 R ]
I In equilibrium, we can derive:
eRt = 1 (1 eRm)(
SYt w
SY
t + 
SL
t b
S
t
wSRt
) ; with  = R=(1 R );
and, wage in innovation:
wSRt = 
R (SYt w
SY
t + 
SL
t b
S
t );
with R > 1 a function of , a choice variable at the level of
rms.  1-to-1 to monitoring intensity (Shapiro-Stiglitz,
1984), which in turn varies inversely with unit monitoring cost
(exogenous) (van Schaik & de Groot (2000)).
I Solow condition satised.
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Labor Supply
I Supply functions:
NUt = N
Z aCt
0
f (a)da = aCt N; and N
S
t =
1  (aCt )2
2
N:
I Supply of S-workers in innovation (aR > aC )
NRt =
(1  aR )(aR + 1)
2
N =
1  (aR )2
2
N:
I Supply of S-labor to manufacturing: NS   NSR where
NSR  NR is actual employment in innovation.
I Index of talent misallocation:
max[0; (NRt   NSRt )=NSYt ]:
I Equilibrium:
NSt = N
SY
t + N
SR
t + N
SL
t ; and N
U
t = N
UL
t + N
UY
t :
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Social Welfare Function
Wt = 0:2
1X
h=0
h(V U ;Et+s + V
U ;L
t+h + V
SY ;E
t+h + V
SR ;E
t+h + V
S ;L
t+h);
with : social discount rate.
I Equal weight to each group; accounts for welfare of all current
and future generations;
I Approximation along the BGE (see paper).
I Alternative: varying weights; but rather arbitrary in such a
model without explicit modelling of insider-outsider.
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Parameterization and Policy Experiments
I Parameterize 2 sets & compare systematically between a HIC
benchmark (Europe-5) and MIC benchmark (Latin
America-5).
I Partial analysis of individual LMR Policies (min wage, UB
rates, cut in union wage mark-ups, training cost cut).
I Examining for policy externalities - Sum of Parts vs LT
e¤ect of Composite Reform Programmes.
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Main Results 1
I Key Results: LMRs entail a two-way causality between
growth and unemployment: dynamic trade-o¤s between
growth, unemployment, & welfare.
I Individual reforms may generate conicting e¤ects on
growth and welfare.
I Rea¢ rms literature that growth & unemployment has weak
relationship. . .
I . . . but policies promoting growth via direct skills expansion
tend to result in absorption problem/oversupply of qualied
labour (specialized unemployment rate going up).
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Steady-state Growth and Welfare E¤ects in a Snapshot
Individual and Composite Experiments: Steady-State Effects
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Main Results 2
I Popular recommendations/implementation of simultaneous
ambitious LM composite reforms can be costly due to
inadequate Policy Externalities.
I In MICs, where e¢ ciency level is lower in both public &
private sectors, public investment in infrastructure, through its
supply-side e¤ects, may help: (i) mitigate the
growth-welfare tradeo¤, and (ii) relieve the absorption
problem of specialized labor.
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Thank You
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Appendix
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Key di¤erences between MIC and HIC
I Higher e¢ ciency and lower cost of training in HIC.
I Lower degree of substitution between intermediate goods in
MIC.
I Higher elasticities of output and innovation activity with
respect to public capital in MIC.
I Higher share of S-workers in innovation in HIC.
I Higher e¢ ciency and lower cost of training in HIC.
I Lower degree of substitution between intermediate goods in
MIC.
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Key di¤erences between MIC and HIC
I Higher elasticities of output and innovation activity w.r.t
public capital in MIC.
I Higher share of S-workers in innovation in HIC.
I Higher open unemployment rate for U-workers (S-workers) in
HIC (MIC).
I Higher payroll tax rate in HIC.
I Higher degree of talent misallocation in MIC.
I Note: other important structural di¤erences are quality of
governance and share of spending on R&D in output.
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Benchmark Parameters
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Benchmark Parameters
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Initial Steady State Values
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Government
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